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Summary 
While the Arab Spring has brought significant opportunities for re-
form and the emergence of more stable democratic states in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA), recent events have seriously un-
dermined security and stability in the region and reshaped the security 
environment there. This has put NATO’s stated ambition of strength-
ening and deepening its regional partnerships in order to address 
common security challenges to the shared goals of peace, security and 
stability into question. This report looks into how NATO is likely to 
address the ‘new’ MENA region by investigating how factors internal 
and external to the Alliance shape its possibilities and limits for 
strengthening and developing partnerships in order to enhance security 
and stability in the region. In addition, this report outlines some impli-
cations this may have for Norwegian security and defence policy. 
 
NATO has so far played a hesitant role towards current conflicts and 
regional rivalries in the MENA region. This reflects its problematic 
historical experience and its fragmented record of developing working 
relationships with partners there. NATO’s role in the MENA region 
has been very limited due to the importance placed on bilateral rela-
tionships among the various MENA states and NATO members as 
well as NATO’s priority given to Eastern and Central Europe after the 
Cold War. The failure to establish common vision and interests be-
tween the partners and NATO have led to a mismatch between what 
NATO is willing to offer and what the MENA partners want from the 
partnerships. Many of the initial difficulties related to the establish-
ment of the partnerships will continue to limit NATO’s possibilities 
for strengthening cooperation with states in the MENA and NATO’s 
stated aim of contributing to regional security and stability.  
 
Moreover, competing priorities within the Alliance and the political 
changes and regional rivalries in the region have made NATO’s ambi-
tion in the region much more complicated to achieve. While NATO’s 
historical track record in the region does not reflect the importance 
placed on the region by many of its members and the organization it-
self, financial constraints and diverging interests have made the situa-
tion even worse. The competing priorities within NATO, as the mem-
bers are facing diverging interests and financial austerity, have exac-
erbated in recent years something that hampers the Alliance’s ability 
to establish a common vision for the future of the MENA region and 
its goals there. Member-state perceptions of risk and threat towards 
the crises vary; and without financial clout or political will, NATO’s 
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ability to achieve consensus on a strategy for furthering security and 
stability in the region remains limited.  
 
With domestic political change sweeping across the Middle East and 
North Africa, struggles for influence and leadership in the region have 
intensified. Given the security interdependencies in the MENA, the 
impact and outcomes of the Arab Spring cannot be understood in iso-
lation from the larger regional picture and the policies and actions of 
major regional players as well as other external factors. Although 
NATO is seeking a far more influential role, through its partnerships, 
in the MENA, such ambitions are likely to be curbed by domestic po-
litical changes that have led to a more assertive audience sceptical to 
the West, and regional rivalries and changing alliances that have led 
states to pursue policies more independent of the West.  This will con-
tinue to hamper NATOs ability to influence states’ strategies and sub-
sequently its possibilities for strengthening and developing its partner-
ships to enhance security and stability on its own terms.  
 
Although NATOs possibilities to address the new security environ-
ment in the MENA is limited by both internal and external factors, it 
has a few options that would increase its chance of playing a more in-
fluential role there in order to strengthen and developing its partner-
ships towards the common goal of security and stability in the region. 
In order to address the new security environment in the MENA, 
NATO needs establish what its goals towards the region are. NATO 
should focus more narrowly on solving common security challenges 
through cooperation rather than the more ambitious goal of enhancing 
security and stability in the region. This will provide NATO with a 
clearer sense of what it wants from its partnerships and what 
‘strengthening and developing partnerships’ actually entails.  
 
In order to make itself more attractive to its partners, NATO must fo-
cus on creating a common ownership with the MENA states over the 
partnerships rather than the current top-down approach. This would 
help establish what the common security challenges are, how to deal 
with them through cooperation and what NATO can offer in this re-
spect. In addition, NATO needs to articulate to its partners what they 
bring of added value that the partners cannot get through its other bi-
lateral agreements. This means becoming more proactive towards its 
partners, inviting them to develop and articulate requests for assis-
tance, in consultation with NATO, on areas where they actually needs 
support rather than making them choose from a list of options.  
 
Because NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian defence and security 
policy, any changes in NATOs priorities will likely have implications 
for Norway. While there are some possibilities for NATO to 
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9 
strengthen and developing its partnerships in order to address the new 
security environment in the MENA, prospects for greater emphasis on 
and prioritization of the region within NATO remains slim, at least in 
the short-term. Even so, the volatility of the region and its proximity 
to the Euro-Atlantic RSC means that contingencies may draw the Al-
liance closer to the region in the future, and as such, events there must 
be followed closely. The main implication that can be drawn from this 
report is that Norway needs to balance its needs for NATO as a collec-
tive defence alliance as well as an Alliance that is both able and will-
ing to contribute collectively to security and stability in its own neigh-
bourhood.  
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Introduction 
While the Arab Spring has brought significant opportunities for re-
form and the emergence of more stable democratic states in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA)1 region, such developments are far 
from certain. NATO’s stated ambition of strengthening and deepening 
its regional partnerships in order to address common security chal-
lenges to the shared goals of peace, security and stability has been put 
into question as insecurity and instability are once again sweeping 
through the region. Unstable democratic transitions in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya, civil war in Syria, the exchange of missiles between Israel 
and Hamas, intensified regional rivalries and power vacuums – these 
are only some of the recent events that have made the MENA region 
more volatile than ever. The result is a changed security environment 
with new risks and challenges, which have already impacted upon the 
Alliance. Security and stability in the MENA region are intertwined 
with the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. How 
NATO approaches the “new” MENA region has become a vital ques-
tion. 
 
How, then, is NATO likely to deal with this new security environ-
ment? The present report looks into this central question by investigat-
ing how factors internal and external to the Alliance shape its possibil-
ities and limits for strengthening and developing partnerships so as to 
enhance security and stability in the MENA region. Because any like-
ly NATO responses will have implications beyond the MENA region, 
the report also examines how this may affect the interests and policies 
of Norway. What is NATO’s current and historical relationship with 
and strategy towards the MENA region and its partnerships? How do 
competing priorities within the Alliance affect the possibilities and 
limits for its future role towards the region? How do the political 
changes within the MENA region shape NATO’s possibilities and 
limits towards the region? How are NATO’s future security policies 
towards the MENA region likely to affect Norwegian security policy 
and interests? These are the specific research questions in focus here.  
 
Following on from the research questions, the first part of the report is 
devoted to a critical examination of NATO’s current and historical 
strategy towards the MENA region and its partnerships there. Alt-
hough the region has been viewed as important to the security and sta-
                                                 
1  The MENA region consists of the states of the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia) and the Middle East (from Egypt in the west to Iran in the east).  
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bility of NATO members, MENA partnerships have always had low 
priority within the Alliance and among its members. The region has 
been dominated by a preference for bilateral relations and the interests 
of major powers and states with historical ties to the region. There has 
also been a mismatch between what NATO has been willing to offer 
in terms of actual security and what the partners have expected. These 
factors continue to put NATO on the sidelines; and, in the current set-
ting of cooperation, the Alliance’s possibilities for dealing with the 
new security environment in the region in any meaningful way appear 
very limited indeed.  
 
The second and main part of the report examines how internal and ex-
ternal factors shape the limits to NATO’s future policy towards the 
region. Firstly, how competing priorities within NATO affect its secu-
rity strategies is examined. Although competing priorities within 
NATO are nothing new, increasingly diverging interests and financial 
austerity have made the competition more intense than ever. This cir-
cumstance obstructs a coherent strategy towards the region and thus 
also NATO’s ability to increase its influence and achieve its aims in 
the MENA. Next, this report looks into the domestic political changes 
and the geopolitical rivalries unfolding in the region since the Arab 
Spring. NATO’s troubled past, domestic political changes, increased 
geopolitical rivalries and shifting alliances as well as its negative repu-
tation among the public in the MENA region have made it increasing-
ly difficult to exercise any influence on the strategies and policies of 
MENA states. It is crucially important for Alliance to re-examine its 
policies and strategies towards the region. How this can be done is the 
focus of the third part of this report.  
 
While there certainly are possibilities for improving current policies 
and strategies, the Alliance first and foremost needs to develop a 
common strategy and vision for the long-term development of the re-
gion on which all 28 NATO members can agree. Without consensus 
on NATO’s role, security policies towards the region are more likely 
to be driven by individual members and their own bilateral relations to 
MENA states than by the Alliance as a whole. Identifying common 
interests and mutual benefits between the Alliance and the states in the 
region will also be important – but NATO’s future policy towards the 
MENA region is as much about the future priorities of the Alliance as 
it is about the security challenges in and from the region and the vari-
ous constellations and rivalries there.  
 
Future NATO policies towards the MENA region are likely to have 
implications also beyond the immediate area as such, through possible 
shifts in political priorities, security interests, regional cooperation 
frameworks and the defence budgets of NATO and its members. 
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Therefore, the final part of this report focuses on how NATO’s proba-
ble future security policy towards the new MENA region may affect 
Norwegian security interests in general.  
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
In explaining how competing priorities within the Alliance and politi-
cal changes in the MENA region may affect the possibilities and lim-
its for NATO’s future role in the region, this report draws on two the-
ory frameworks. To examine the internal workings in NATO, this re-
search has been informed by practice theory, which distances itself 
from the more traditional realist and constructivist theories in interna-
tional relations, by stressing the need to analyse the shared practices of 
NATO, what the states do together, rather than traditional security in-
terests or identity. In order to analyse how external factors are influ-
encing the limits and possibilities for NATO’s future policy towards 
the MENA, this report draws on Regional Security Complex (RSC) 
theory. This theory is informative on how to study security regionally. 
Complex regional security interdependencies means that security con-
cerns cannot be analysed apart from each other, something that makes 
regional security an important area of study. In addition, RSC theory 
is informative on how regions may also consist of different subcom-
plexes and how outside powers shape and alter the security interde-
pendencies of the RSCs. This makes this theory very apt for studying 
the MENA region and its relations to outside powers such as NATO.  
 
Thinkers within the realist camp in international relations have viewed 
the presence of a common enemy like the Soviet Union as a prerequi-
site for a military alliance. In the early 1990s, realists argued that, 
without an external enemy, the Alliance would lose the very reason 
for its existence: ‘It is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that 
holds NATO together.’2 Seeking to explain the persistence of NATO 
despite the loss of the Soviet ‘glue’, a burgeoning literature emerged 
from the constructivist camp. From this perspective, NATO did not 
fragment as predicted by realists because its members shared common 
values and a collective identity. For constructivists like Adler and 
Barnett3, collective identity is the key mechanism for the development 
of security communities – the dependable expectations of peaceful 
exchange. Recently however, this idea of collective identity as a pre-
requisite for security communities has been challenged. Vincent 
Pouliot holds that such communities emerges out of shared practices, 
                                                 
2  Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, 
International Security, No. 15, Summer, p. 52. See also Waltz, K. N. (1993), “The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, No. 18, Fall, pp.75–
76.  
3  See for instance, Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael (1998) eds., Security Communities, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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rather than a common identity in the sense that ‘it is not only who we 
are that drives what we do; it is also what we do that determines who 
we are’.4 In this sense, ‘defending the West defines the West’,5 and 
whatever the West and its institutionalized self (NATO) is, is deter-
mined by what we do together. This insight has profound implications 
for how we view NATO, not merely as a security community, but also 
as a political community and military alliance whose members see 
their security as intertwined along with the necessity of common ac-
tion.  
 
Although the transatlantic security community is alive and well, 
NATO as political community of states who believe it should act to-
gether is rapidly deteriorating. Strains in the Alliance are nothing new 
and the debate about its future has become a part of what NATO is, 
but financial austerity and diverging interests have intensified in re-
cent years, adding a new dimension to this debate. Even if the mem-
bers were to agree on the future of NATO, many of them lack the fi-
nancial means to collaborate on common challenges. The absence of a 
shared approach to the MENA region reflects the competing priorities 
within the Alliance, which stand in contrast to the very real security 
challenges there. This may change due to unforeseen events, but if 
competing priorities within the Alliance continue to hamper shared 
practices, what we do together, what NATO is, will profoundly 
change. Thus, the key to understanding how NATO will approach the 
new security environment in the MENA region lies in analysing how 
lack of cooperation, or shared practices, in an era of financial austerity 
and diverging interests,  is likely to affect the Alliance. 
 
Because NATO does not function in a vacuum, but is continuously 
responding and reacting to external events, how it interacts with other 
states and regions is determined by what happens outside the Alliance 
as well as within it. In order to understand how political changes with-
in the MENA region shape NATO’s possibilities and limits towards 
the region, this report draws on the theory of Regional Security Com-
plexes (RSCs). RSCs are a set of units whose security concerns are so 
interlinked that they cannot be analysed or resolved apart from each 
other. According to Buzan and Wæver, ‘the formation and operation 
of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the 
system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and 
interpretations of actors.’6 In order to understand how NATO is likely 
to approach the new MENA region, it is crucial to analyse and link the 
internal conditions of states in the region, relations among units in the 
                                                 
4  Pouliot, Vincent (2010), International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia 
Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.5.  
5  Gow, James (2005) Defending the West, London: Polity, p.17. 
6  Buzan, Barry, and Wæver, Ole (2004). Regions and Powers: The Structure of National 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.40. 
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region, relations among the Euro-Atlantic and the MENA region and 
the interplay of regional dynamics and other outside powers. Although 
a thorough study of the region and its interactions with the outside 
world is beyond the scope of this report, a brief overview of the region 
and its links to NATO is offered, to indicate the Alliance’s possibili-
ties and limits in terms of deepening its cooperation with MENA 
states and addressing the new security environment in the region. 
What makes the MENA region so complex is that there exist within it 
several sub-complexes, or smaller patterns of security interdependen-
cies, as in the Levant or the Gulf, where these interdependencies over-
lap with each other and the wider MENA RSC. In addition, patterns of 
amity and enmity in the region are in constant flux, and rivalries and 
alliances are fluid, as the Arab Spring has highlighted. Because securi-
ty concerns usually do not travel well over distances, NATO’s ambi-
tions to contributing to security and stability in the region will hinge 
on understanding the security interdependencies within the region, to 
enable it to forge cooperation with states amidst shifting geopolitical 
rivalries and domestic political change. On the other hand, there are 
considerable connection between the security and stability in the 
MENA and that of the Euro-Atlantic, both in terms of geography but 
also in terms of common security concerns such as Iran, energy flows 
and terrorism. Turkey, a NATO member, is situated in both the Euro-
Atlantic RSC and the broader MENA RCS, leading to a considerable 
overlap between the region and NATO. In addition, the geographical 
proximity of the MENA region to other European states means that it 
is not ‘out-of-area’ to the Euro-Atlantic RSC but part of a larger re-
gion that should be considered as part of the whole.  
 
Because any involvement in the region will necessarily follow the 
lines of existing alliances and rivalries, NATO must recognize that 
this will serve to reinforce existing amities and enmities; this may in-
crease the security of some, it may decrease the security of others. 
Understanding the regional security dilemmas is important if the goal 
is greater security and stability in the region and for its members. 
 
These theory frameworks indicate the importance of analysing the in-
ternal dynamics within NATO and the MENA region as well as their 
external relations and their interactions with each other, in order to 
gain an understanding of how NATO could address the new MENA 
region. For the purposes of the present report, this has been done 
through a range of interlinked research tasks connecting desk studies 
and interviews. Through an extensive literature review, NATO’s his-
torical interaction with the MENA region has been assessed, as a criti-
cal examination of past policies and strategies as well as the existing 
partnerships is important to future NATO–MENA relationships. The 
second research objective has been to analyse the discourses and prac-
16 Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud 
tices of NATO and key member states through reviewing official 
statements, policies, strategies and secondary literature. This has re-
vealed differing views on security policies and strategies among 
NATO members as well as shifting NATO priorities – something that 
will affect the Alliance’s strategy towards the MENA region. Thirdly, 
a brief analysis of the changing dynamics in the region has been un-
dertaken to elucidate how NATO might approach the new security 
environment in the MENA region. The complexity and volatility of 
the region make predictions almost impossible, but the likely interests 
of the major powers in the region and that of NATO members can of-
fer indications as to how and where NATO will concentrate its efforts. 
Due to the rapid changes underway within the MENA region, and the 
inherent differences between discourse and practice of NATO and its 
member states, it has been essential to conduct interviews with a range 
of NATO officials and country delegations in order to confirm or re-
pudiate findings as well as to gain a deeper understanding of the inter-
nal workings within the Alliance. In addition, direct interviews have 
been important because of the limited amount of secondary literature 
and restricted availability of official NATO material on the MENA 
region. This report draws on interviews and conversations conducted 
during two visits to NATO HQ in Brussels.  
   
The Troubled History of NATO’s  
Partnerships in the MENA 
During the Cold War, the two superpowers, as well as former colonial 
powers like France and the UK, were rivalling each other for influence 
in the strategically important MENA region. This brought considera-
ble opportunities for the states of the region to exploit: bilateral rela-
tions were forged with those outside powers they sided with ideologi-
cally or could gain the most from. In this game NATO was more or 
less absent, and only after the fall of the Soviet Union did it establish 
formal cooperation and partnerships with states in the MENA region. 
These partnerships have existed for some time now, but have been 
criticized for being no more than talk-shops that have contributed little 
of relevance to either NATO or the partner states – due not least to the 
fact that bilateral relations and interests of major powers that dominat-
ed the region during the Cold War have in large part remained. In ad-
dition, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, priority was 
given to enlarging NATO’s community of values by including former 
Warsaw Pact states in Eastern and Central Europe, with lower priority 
accorded to NATO’s partnerships in the MENA region. Also, the ab-
sence of a link between partnership and enlargement in the MENA, 
due to unwillingness on the part of NATO as well as MENA states, 
meant that NATO’s influence would always be far more limited than 
in Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, the failure to establish 
common vision and interests between MENA partners and NATO has 
led to a gap in perceptions about what the partnerships are all about, 
resulting in a mismatch between what NATO is willing to offer and 
what the MENA partners want.  
The Mediterranean Dialogue 
The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)7 was established in 1994, in order 
to contribute to regional security and stability and achieving mutual 
understanding – along with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-
gramme in Central and Eastern Europe as an integral part of NATO’s 
adaptation to a post-Cold War security environment. Several Southern 
European NATO members – France, Italy and Spain – wanted the Al-
liance to devote more attention to the Mediterranean. As the Spanish 
am bassador to NATO at that time argued, ‘If the alliance is trying to 
                                                 
7  The MD consists of seven non-NATO partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Maurita-
nia, Morocco and Tunisia. 
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project stability to the East, we should also be able to project stability 
toward the South.’8  
 
Although nothing came of the attempts of former NATO Secretary 
General, Willy Claes, to re-assert the Alliance by arguing that Islamic 
fundamentalism was ‘at least as dangerous’ as Communism had once 
been, the Mediterranean Dialogue was in large part created to counter 
this perceived threat. The establishment of the MD in 1994 signalled 
that security and stability in the Mediterranean were closely linked to 
that of the Alliance, but the Dialogue was predicated on a negative 
basis – for managing perceived threats, rather than encouraging the 
Mediterranean states to become real partners. This stood in stark con-
trast to the PfP, where the idea of reintegration of former Soviet-bloc 
states into the European fold topped the agenda.9 In addition, Smith 
and Davis argue that the creation of the MD can be seen less as a 
move to actually address security challenges in the region, and more 
as an attempt to not be left behind in the emerging institutional com-
petition in the region. When the MD was established, both the OSCE 
and the then Western European Union (WEU) had established pro-
grammes and links to the region.10 If the motives for establishing the 
MD were based largely on a negative basis or sheer competition for 
influence in the region, then it is hardly difficult to understand why 
NATO has failed to develop jointly defined challenges and a common 
vision for the partnership with its Mediterranean partners. A lack of 
common vision can also be traced to intra-NATO divisions over secu-
rity priorities in the Mediterranean and the overall MD process – the 
result being that NATO’s intentions are not always clear, which re-
mains an obstacle to deeper cooperation.11  
 
While the Dialogue’s bilateral structure (NATO+1) has faced signifi-
cant difficulties, its multilateral set-up (NATO+7) must be deemed a 
failure. Although differences in security perceptions among the MD 
members have factored in here, this is primarily the result of including 
Israel, a country which many of the partner states have been reluctant 
to work with or have viewed with direct hostility. The problems have 
only deepened since Israel’s operations in Gaza in 2008/2009 and 
2012, but the breakdown of Turkish–Israeli relations after the flotilla 
incident in 2010 has made matters even worse, with Turkey obstruct-
ing NATO from collaborating with Israel. Although this does not 
                                                 
8  Ames, Paul (1995) ‘NATO Calls for New Links With North Africa, Israel’, Associated 
Press, 8 February 1995. 
9  Smith, Martin A. and Davis, Ian (2011), ‘NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in the Wake 
of the Arab Spring: Partnership for Peace or Succour for Despots?’, NATO Watch, Brief-
ing Paper no.19, 27 June 2011. 
10  Smith and Davis (2011). 
11  Gaub, Florence (2012), Against all Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Re-
gion, Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p.8. See also Win-
row, G. (2000), Dialogue with the Mediterranean: The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean 
Initiative, New York: Garland. 
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mean that the bilateral part of the MD has broken down – only slowed 
down – it is of grave concern, as both Turkey and Israel are the two 
main allies of the USA in the region. In NATO this problem has hard-
ly been taken up, and there is even a reluctance to talk about it, espe-
cially on record.12   
 
Unsurprisingly, the problems with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue 
highlighted here have led Chris Donnelly to the following scathing 
conclusion: ‘unlike the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dia-
logue has not been a great success. It has played no significant role in 
helping and promoting the evolution of participating countries.’13  
 
Seeking to overcome these deficiencies, at its summit meeting in Is-
tanbul in June 2004 NATO established ‘a more ambitious and ex-
panded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue’ aimed at contrib-
uting to regional security and stability through enhanced practical co-
operation, ‘whose objective would include: enhancing the existing po-
litical dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform 
and contributing to the fight against terrorism’.14 This elevated the 
MD to a more genuine partnership on a par with the PfP, but it did lit-
tle to remedy the root problems. At the same summit, NATO’s other 
partnership programme in the MENA region was launched: the Istan-
bul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).15  
The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
According to NATO, the ICI ‘aims to contribute to long-term global 
and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East 
region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.’16 The ini-
tiative was launched against the backdrop of the post-invasion chaos 
in Iraq, arguably motivated by the ‘urgent need to secure regional 
support for efforts to stabilise Iraq’ and the wider US-led war on ter-
ror,17 with both counterterrorism and counter-proliferation operations 
explicitly mentioned as areas for collaboration. In line with this, the 
ICI adopted ‘a bottom–up approach by building practical military-to-
military ties to flesh out the political rapprochement.’18 The ICI’s fo-
cus on practical cooperation within a purely bilateral framework 
                                                 
12  Interviews at NATO HQ, Brussels, 17-18 September, 2012. 
13  Donnelly, Chris (2004) ‘Building a NATO Partnership for the Greater Middle East’, 
NATO Review, 1, 2004. 
14  NATO Policy Document, A more Ambitious and Expanded Framework for the Mediter-
ranean Dialogue, NATO Summit, Istanbul, 28-29 June, 2004. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-meddial.htm  
15  The ICI consists of four non-NATO members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
16  Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO website, available at:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm 
17  Smith and Davis (2011). Op. cit. 
18  Samaan, Jean-Loup (2012) ‘NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Cause?’, Research 
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(NATO+1) stood in contrast to the MD’s focus on mutual understand-
ing through dialogue and its bilateral and multilateral setup, and was 
seen as a way to overcome the difficulties like those encountered by 
the MD. Although the ICI was set up in a bilateral fashion, emphasiz-
ing a bottom–up approach focusing on practical cooperation on coun-
terterrorism and counter-proliferation, it suffers from many of the 
same problems as the MD. There is a chronic absence of vision from 
NATO on what it wants from its partnerships, as well as a lack of in-
centives for partners to engage NATO. According to Saaman, 
‘strengthening cooperation in the operational domain could have been 
effective if there had been a clear common perception of the ICI’s rai-
son d’etre.’19 In addition, a basic problem with the establishment of 
the ICI was the absence of the major US allied power in the region: 
Saudi Arabia. With its military and economic power, Saudi Arabia 
holds tremendous sway over its lesser partners in the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, from where the ICI partners were drawn. Although Sau-
di Arabia has shown interest in collaborating with NATO, it has not 
been willing to enter into a partnership thus far. Without the most in-
fluential state in the Gulf region as a partner, and lacking a clear vi-
sion and incentives to its partners, it is not difficult to conclude, with 
Saaman, that ‘eight years after NATO initiated its engagement with 
the Gulf countries, the results have been modest, not to say disap-
pointing.’20  
 
Another problem concerns how NATO divided the MENA regional 
security complex and its subcomplexes into two clusters – the MD, 
consisting mainly of the North African states, and the ICI the Gulf 
States. As pointed out by Isaac, this ‘misleadingly places the “Middle 
East”, actually the most important security subsystem in MENA, in an 
indefinite intermediate position between the Mediterranean and the 
Gulf.’21 While this is undoubtedly problematic, engaging the whole 
MENA security complex has been difficult for NATO due to histori-
cal circumstances and its status in the region. NATO has engaged 
‘friendly’ states in the region along pre-existing patterns of rivalries 
and alliances, thereby in fact reinforcing regional amities and enmi-
ties. At the time, the regional clustering of the states into the MD and 
the ICI was done largely because they were believed to have similar 
security concerns and could thus work together. That was a mistake, 
and raises the question of whether bilateral agreements (NATO + 1) 
with the various states outside of the current partnership programmes 
would not have been a better approach, or could at least have served 
the same purpose.   
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It could be argued that NATO would always be playing a losing battle 
for influence in the MENA as its primary objective was Central and 
Eastern Europe, whereas bilateral ties between various members and 
the MENA states were already established and thriving. As such, ‘de-
spite the limited success of NATO’s official partnerships in the 
MENA region, bilateral military and intelligence relationships be-
tween major players in the Middle East and the US, UK, and France 
are thriving.’22 For example, the first three countries to establish Indi-
vidual Cooperation Programmes (ICPs) with NATO – Egypt, Israel 
and Jordan – are also the states in the region that have the closest ties 
to the US and that receive the most in military aid. In addition, there is 
considerable overlap and parallel projects offered through bilateral 
projects to those offered by NATO, and many NATO members view 
these partnerships as conflicting with their bilateral agreements in the 
region.23 In this situation, individual NATO members seem to be the 
main competitor to the Alliance in its efforts at deepening its coopera-
tion with states in the MENA region.24 Historical ties to the region and 
regional interests of individual NATO countries certainly trump over 
the MD and ICI partnerships when strategies are formulated. Thus it 
should come as no surprise that the partnerships are often overlooked, 
chronically weak in both human and material resources, in turn result-
ing in very modest gains.25 Indeed, what can be the added value of 
partnership programmes when the MENA countries get the same or 
more out of bilateral relations? 
 
What the states in the MENA really desire, besides from practical fix-
es to security challenges, are security guarantees from NATO against 
external as well as internal threats to their regimes – but this is some-
thing NATO is neither willing nor able to offer. It seems that all 
NATO is willing to provide of value to its partners are ‘military exer-
cises and related education and training activities’.26Although valued 
by the MENA states, such training focuses primarily on interoperabil-
ity, with the purpose of having the partners contribute to NATO mis-
sions – which only reinforces MENA suspicions of NATO as having a 
hidden agenda to control the states in the region.27 This mismatch be-
tween what NATO is willing to offer and what the MENA partners 
want creates a gap in perceptions symptomatic of the failure to estab-
lish a sense of common purpose and a common approach to security 
challenges.  
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NATO’s new Strategic Concept28, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 
November 2010, identifies cooperative security as one of three core 
tasks for the Alliance, which constitutes an opportunity to move part-
nerships to the next generation. Although written before the Arab 
Spring, and despite the Alliance’s troubled record in the MENA re-
gion, the Strategic Concept is clear in its ambition to further develop 
and deepen the partnership and cooperation with the MD and ICI 
partners as well as being open to including more states in the MENA 
region. At the Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in 2011, the 
MENA partners were offered the same cooperation package as the Eu-
ro-Atlantic partners ‘to substantially deepen and broaden NATO’s 
partnerships, and increase their effectiveness and flexibility.’29 In ad-
dition, any state participating in the MD or ICI can also step up its po-
litical and security cooperation with NATO through an Individual and 
Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP). As yet, none of the par-
ticipants in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has an IPCP, whereas 
in the Mediterranean Dialogue it is only Algeria out of the seven 
members that does not have an IPCP with NATO. On the other hand, 
the details of what each country takes from the toolbox and attendance 
records at various events and training courses remain confidential, 
making it difficult to assess what these partnerships really offer.  
 
Despite the limited success of the MENA partnerships over the years, 
NATO’s military operation in Libya showed the utility of the partner-
ships, with Qatar, the UAE, Morocco and Jordan playing key opera-
tional roles. The trust generated from the MENA partnerships helped 
NATO to find regional support for military action against the Gadhafi 
regime, while ‘behind the scenes’ consultations with its partners were 
conducted prior to the operation.30 This happened at the same time as 
NATO was finalizing its new partnership policies at the Foreign Min-
isters’ Meeting in Berlin, and Operation Unified Protector reinforced 
the objective of the Lisbon Summit, which called for a more efficient 
and flexible partnership policy. Although this demonstrated the validi-
ty of a longstanding commitment to partnerships within the Alliance, 
as the partners proved vital for regional support and legitimacy as well 
as the ability to work together in the face of common security chal-
lenges, the actual assets deployed by partners was of limited value to 
the Libya operation. 
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Limitations for NATO’s Future Policy 
towards the MENA Region 
Although the troubled history of NATO’s relationship with the 
MENA region reveals many difficulties that continue to hamper its 
partnerships, additional factors limit NATO’s future policies towards 
the region. The first factor that is considered in this report is internal 
to the Alliance: it concerns the competing priorities between the 
member states as they face financial austerity and have diverging in-
terests. Although there is nothing new about competing priorities 
within the Alliance, in today’s situation of financial austerity the room 
for action diminishes, and diverging interests may become more ex-
plicit, resulting in less cooperation. This lessening of shared practices 
means that what the Alliance is will change, and possibly also the be-
lief in the necessity of common action. The second factor is external 
to the Alliance: it involves an analysis of the political changes and re-
gion rivalries in the MENA. These political changes alter the relation-
ships within the MENA RSC as well as between the Euro-Atlantic and 
the larger MENA regional security complexes to such an extent that 
existing alliances and partnerships need to be re-examined and re-
thought. Both these factors limit NATO’s possibilities for forging a 
coherent strategy towards the region and its stated aim of strengthen-
ing and deepening its partnerships to enhance regional security and 
stability.   
Internal limitations – Competing Priorities within the Alli-
ance 
Despite the many predictions of the demise of NATO with the end of 
the Cold War, it managed to survive by adapting to the new security 
environment. Today, the future of the Alliance is again being ques-
tioned. Defence budgets have been slashed and diverging security in-
terests are more evident than ever before – between the US and Eu-
rope, as well as among the states of Europe. These trends led former 
US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to warn of the real possibility 
of a ‘dim, if not a dismal future’31 for the Alliance. NATO as a securi-
ty community may be alive and well, but its ability to solve security 
issues collectively is dwindling.  
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The NATO-led Libya operation highlighted both the diverging inter-
ests and the financial austerity within the Alliance. The most obvious 
conclusion to be drawn was the lack of unity, with less than one third 
of the member states willing to participate in strike missions. It also 
highlighted a trend that has been visible for some time: NATO acts as 
a resource pool for coalitions of the willing. While this is something 
can add the speed and flexibility necessary for the conduct of modern 
war, it also points up the problem of burden-sharing within the Alli-
ance. Despite its military success, Operation Unified Protector high-
lighted the lack of military means among NATO’s European mem-
bers, symptomatic of a long and steady decline in defence invest-
ments. It was especially the enablers of modern warfare – intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets – that the Europeans 
lacked; then, as some states ran short of munitions, the Libya opera-
tion underlined Europe’s inability to act independently of US capabili-
ties.  
 
This led Gates to conclude that NATO had become a two-tiered alli-
ance. According to Gates this was not only a matter of the lack of will, 
as on previous occasions, but also the lack of capabilities. ‘Many of 
those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want 
to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities 
simply aren't there.’32 With many members simply not able to partici-
pate, NATO is moving into an era where future operations may not 
only be conducted by ‘coalitions of the willing’ as in the past, but in-
creasingly only by ‘coalitions of the able’, if the current decline in de-
fence spending continues. While NATO has never gone to war with 
the full support of all its members in combat operations, if it remains 
unable to act together due to lack of will or ability, what NATO is will 
continue to change and with it the belief in the necessity of common 
action.  
Financial Austerity 
North American and European cuts in current and future defence 
budgets have raised concerns about the future of NATO’s military ca-
pabilities and transatlantic security cooperation. As Ivo Daalder, the 
US Permanent Representative to NATO, and James Stavridis, 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, have warned in a re-
cent Foreign Affairs article, ‘if defence spending continues to decline, 
NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another 
decade.’33 The authors of a large-scale Brookings Institution study on 
the effects of the economic crisis on defence budgets conclude that 
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‘the economic crisis is having a significant – and detrimental – impact 
on allied armed forces’, and caution that ‘current military spending 
trends are reducing the ability of most NATO allies to contribute to 
international security.’34 In addition to former Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates’ warning that the USA ‘may not consider the return on 
America’s investment in NATO worth the cost’,35 if the Europeans do 
not contribute more to their common defence, the current Secretary of 
Defense, Leon Panetta, has argued that ‘we are facing dramatic cuts 
with real implications for alliance capability.’36 Unsurprisingly, much 
of the criticism comes from the USA, which has grown tired of carry-
ing most of the burden of transatlantic security cooperation. Although 
these warnings are not new and may be part of an ongoing ‘transatlan-
tic ritual’ where the US side continuously requests greater European 
financial and political commitment, also NATO officials and Europe-
an politicians are voicing concerns. NATO’s Secretary General has 
argued that if ‘European defence spending cuts continue, Europe’s 
ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly 
disappear.’37 Furthermore, these warnings are no longer only about 
NATO’s ability to project power outside its borders: they also ques-
tion its ability to defend its own members. In a speech in January 
2012, former Norwegian Defence Minister Espen Barth Eide warned: 
‘Article V is not in such good shape (…) Exercises have shown that 
NATO’s ability to conduct conventional military operations has mark-
edly declined … Not only is NATO’s ability to defend its member 
states questionable, it might actually deteriorate further as financial 
pressures in Europe and the US force cuts in military spending.’38 The 
effects of the economic crisis on NATO’s military capabilities are a 
new development that should be taken seriously.  
 
In response to the problems connected to defence cuts in most mem-
ber states, the Alliance has put defence cooperation or ‘Smart De-
fence’ at the top of the agenda. As explained by NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Smart Defence is a new guiding 
principle for capability development. By joining together to acquire 
capabilities, nations will be able to afford what they cannot do alone. 
It is about greater resource efficiency and doing better with what we 
have (…) The key to Smart Defence is greater prioritization, speciali-
zation and, most importantly, multinational cooperation.’39 This is an 
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initiative launched as the solution to the current crisis, and while there 
certainly is room for smarter spending as regards defence, there are 
several problems with the Smart Defence concept.  
 
First of all, Smart Defence involves only measures for future capabil-
ity developments and other long-term projects, not for dealing with 
the current crisis and current cuts. Many member states are scaling 
back their defence budgets and cutting critical capabilities, with little 
or no consultation with their allies.40 This may lead to a capability cri-
sis, leaving the Alliance with at best an insufficient number of critical 
capabilities not only to conduct crisis management, but also for collec-
tive defence under Article V – as warned by Norway’s Barth Eide. It 
may be more critical to deal with current cuts instead of focusing on 
future capabilities under the Smart Defence banner.  
 
Greater specialization, one of three core aspects of Smart Defence, is 
highly problematic, as it infringes on the sovereignty and freedom to 
act/not to act of its members. With specialization, each member would 
focus on its own niche, leaving other capabilities to other states in or-
der to avoid duplication of efforts. In turn, this means that in an opera-
tion NATO would need the full support of all its members in order to 
have access to the entire war-fighting inventory. Judging from recent 
operations, not least in Libya, consensus from all members on the use 
of force is hard to obtain. Should one member with a critical ability 
refuse to make its resources available to an operation, that capability is 
lost, and will be hard to replace. Although capabilities are vital for the 
conduct of an operation, without the political will, no operation can be 
conducted. In this sense, it is political will and not the ability that is 
the problem – and this is something Smart Defence does not address. 
To deal with the capability problem, NATO will need to find a com-
mon ground for aligning the interests of all its members, to be able to 
set priorities as to what kinds of capabilities it needs for the future. 
Although smarter spending may be a necessity, the Smart Defence 
rhetoric and the importance of the concept within NATO clearly de-
fines future capabilities as being more important than efforts to build 
organizational cohesion. In fact the two are intertwined and cannot be 
dealt with separately.  
Diverging Interests 
The divergence of interests within NATO has become increasingly 
evident since the end of the Cold War, but the Libya operation and 
Washington’s new rebalancing strategy points towards an Alliance 
that is not only two-tiered – where some members bear the burdens 
while others do not want to share the risks and costs – as Gates ar-
                                                 
40  Interview with NATO official, 17 September 2012. 
NATO in the ‘New’ MENA Region      27 
 
27 
gued, but also one that is torn by different interests and views on the 
changing security environment.  
 
For the US, diverging interests and financial constraints have mani-
fested themselves in a continuing shift in the main security focus, 
away from Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific region. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has labelled the coming period as 
the country’s Pacific century, arguing that ‘[t]he future of politics will 
be decided in Asia (…) and the United States will be right at the cen-
tre of the action’.41 This will see the US military rebalance its forces 
from other regions to Asia, as well as rebalancing within the Asia-
Pacific region, spreading its forces throughout the entire region. The 
fact that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has visited the Asia-
Pacific region four times since taking office in July 2011 underlines 
this shift in US priorities. According to Panetta, Washington will ‘de-
vote more resources and effort to building its partners’ capabilities and 
improving interoperability between the US military and forces in the 
region (…), and plans to have 60 per cent of its naval fleet based in 
the Pacific by 2020 and [the] defence budget has preserved, and even 
boosted, investment in new and more capable assets needed in the Pa-
cific theatre.’42 Despite the shift in priorities, Panetta is keen to stress 
that ‘even as America rebalances towards the Asia-Pacific region, it 
will retain a significant presence in the Middle East to deter aggres-
sion and promote stability.’ This statement was probably intended to 
reassure its allies in the region, but at the same time Iran is likely to 
keep the US involved in the MENA. It may be that the Iranian issue, 
which will continue to consume much of the US’s diplomatic, politi-
cal and security resources, is an area where the US and Europe can 
find common security interests, serving as Europe’s best option for 
‘keeping the Americans in’. Although the US remains committed to 
NATO, it is clear that its interests now lie away from the European 
continent, making this shift in US strategy a clear signal to the Euro-
peans that they will have to take more responsibility for defence and 
security in their own region. Due to the security interdependencies be-
tween the MENA and the European RSC, it is likely that ‘softer’ secu-
rity issues in the MENA region, except for the Iranian issue and ter-
rorism, will be largely left to the Europeans to deal with.  
 
A divergence of interests is also visible within Europe. The major 
fault-lines previously went between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, but today 
there is a fragmentation of interests all over the continent. While the 
Central and Eastern European states are still largely preoccupied with 
their Russian neighbour, Western Europe have in recent years experi-
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enced several disagreements when it comes to security policy and 
strategy. This was particularly evident in the build-up to the Iraq war 
in 2003, but disagreements also arose over the Libya operation, show-
ing that patterns of agreements and disagreements continue to shift 
along with the issues at hand. While the European countries do not 
agree on where to send troops, most members, with the exception of 
France and the UK at least, prefer NATO to focus primarily on its Ar-
ticle V commitments rather than engaging globally and in ‘out-of-
area’ missions. It could be argued that the limited number of partici-
pating states in the Libya operation shows that the Alliance is divided 
on what it views as ‘in area’ and ‘out-of-area’– but this is not due 
solely to geography, as many Northern Europeans states took part in 
the operation. Due to its proximity and considerable overlap with the 
Euro RSC, it is difficult to view the MENA region as being ‘out-of-
area’. 
Future of NATO – Regionalization, Global Security Network or All 
at Once? 
One emerging trend in responding to the growing divergence of inter-
ests and declining defence budgets within NATO is for groupings of 
member states and non-NATO states, such as the Nordic Defence Co-
operation (NORDEFCO), the Northern Group, the Visegrad Group43 
and the Franco-British Axis,44 to explore the possibilities of enhancing 
cooperation on security issues as well as Smart Defence projects to 
complement existing arrangements within NATO. This seems set to 
continue, as members will increasingly seek cooperation with states 
that share their interests and/or that are willing to shoulder the cost of 
building necessary capabilities. Thus far, NATO has been supportive 
of these developments, viewing them as beneficial for meeting ‘smart 
defence’ targets,45 but it remains to be seen whether these regional 
clusterings make NATO more effective or less so, in terms of deci-
sion-making capacity and operational effectiveness.  
 
The willingness of France and the UK to act decisively, as witnessed 
in Libya, contributes to the shaping of European security policy and 
strategy and thus also has an impact upon NATO’s future trajectory. 
Although bilateral and trilateral defence relations involving key Euro-
pean players (e.g. France-Britain + n) may loom much larger in the 
future than commitment to NATO,46 it is, according to Hallams and 
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Schreer, doubtful whether a European coalition of the willing orga-
nized around France and Britain can provide a model for real transat-
lantic burden-sharing in the future.47 Although Franco-British cooper-
ation may supplement the broader cooperation within both NATO and 
the EU, it excludes more than half of the European military potential. 
Judging from the Libya operation, it is of paramount importance for 
the Europeans to find a way of working together more closely, to 
build their capabilities and act in unison.  
 
While financial austerity and diverging interests continues to hamper 
security and defence cooperation within the Alliance, NATO itself has 
embarked on an ambitious attempt to make itself relevant in the new 
security environment by ‘going global’, rather than sorting out its in-
ternal issues and focusing on strengthening and developing its existing 
partnerships. This arguably changes NATO’s identity from being a 
collective defence alliance and a crisis manager towards a global secu-
rity enabler. According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, NATO has become 
two different organizations: one structured around Article V as a col-
lective defence alliance, and one as the hub in a global security net-
work, a collective security asset for its global partners.48 How the ten-
sions between these ‘two NATOs’ will play out and the debate on 
NATO’s core function(s) will be crucial for the future of the Alliance.  
 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept elevated cooperative security to one 
of its three core tasks, alongside collective defence and crisis man-
agement. This was a significant step in the evolution away from the 
static defence of the Cold War towards a new proactive cooperative 
security model deemed vital ‘in today’s security and economic climate 
(…) if we are to maintain our edge.’49According to the Strategic Con-
cept, ‘the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through 
a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisa-
tions around the globe. These partners make a concrete and valued 
contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.’50  
 
Since taking office in August 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen has stressed the need for NATO to ‘go global’, as 
the perceived key threats to the Alliance stem from global challenges 
such as failed states, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, piracy, energy 
security and cyber threats. In a lengthy speech in July 2012, the Secre-
tary General, explained his vision for the future of NATO: 
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It is as important to invest in strong partnerships as it is to invest in modern mili-
tary hardware, and in flexible forces (…) We cannot deal with today’s security 
challenges from a purely European perspective. What matters is being engaged 
wherever our security matters. That means here in Europe. Across the Euro-
Atlantic area. And around the globe (…) This is about NATO assuming a global 
perspective. Playing its part globally, and strengthening our ability to act in con-
cert with our partners around the globe (…) We need an alliance that is globally 
aware. Globally connected. And globally capable. That is my vision for NATO. 51 
 
This echoed a 2009 article by the former US National Security Advis-
er, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in which he argued that NATO ‘has the ex-
perience, the institutions, and the means to eventually become the hub 
of a globe-spanning web of various regional cooperative-security un-
dertakings among states with the growing power to act.’ In addition, 
such a vision of NATO as a hub in a global security network would 
serve two interests: ‘NATO would not only be preserving transatlantic 
political unity it would also be responding to the twenty-first century’s 
novel and increasingly urgent security agenda.’52 In an era of financial 
austerity, where most NATO members are likely to invest in collec-
tive defence capabilities over globally deployable forces, it makes 
good sense to enlist as many partners as possible, across the globe, to 
be globally capable. Although a more global NATO may be able to 
respond better to new and urgent challenges, it seems highly doubtful 
whether such a strategic mission would preserve transatlantic political 
unity.  
 
Partnerships are not an end in themselves and although the inclusion 
of more and more members to the NATO fold might possibly have 
peaceful effects, there is a strong need to articulate the larger strategic 
objectives these partnerships are meant to serve and how they will 
work in practice. Although Rasmussen and Brzezinski argue for why 
NATO needs new global partners and US President Obama and 
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen now both agree that NATO is a 
hub in a global security network,53 the idea of a ‘Global NATO’ opens 
up an array of difficult issues that need to be dealt with. At the crux is 
the unanswered question of what NATO’s core function(s) should be.  
 
At the Berlin meeting in April 2011 it was concluded that more opera-
tional partners would provide greater flexibility, and that NATO 
should expand its consultations with other states and organizations 
outside the Euro-Atlantic area on topics of mutual interest in the 28 + 
N format. However, the debate on how broad this N should be is still 
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ongoing,54 and broadening NATO’s partnership outlook, instead of 
focusing on existing partnerships, may come at the expense those in 
the MENA region.  
 
In the debate about the future of NATO’s partnerships there is more at 
stake. As Rebecca Moore argues, ‘disagreements within the Alliance 
in recent years over the form and function of NATO’s partnerships 
reflect an absence of consensus regarding NATO’s core function, in-
cluding the extent to which its focus should be global rather than re-
gional in nature.’55 It might be argued that, by partnering up with 
states such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific 
region – an area of low relevance to many European member states – 
the idea of ‘going global’ is a way for NATO to make itself relevant in 
a bid to ‘keep the Americans in’. While this is indeed important, 
NATO might be in danger of making itself less relevant for its Euro-
pean partners, who want it to focus on collective defence and chal-
lenges within its own neighbourhood and possibly also its existing 
partnerships. This may mean that NATO is driving states away from 
the multilateral security framework and towards a regionalization or 
even re-nationalization of security policies. Although it remains to be 
seen whether regional clustering will enhance or undermine NATO’s 
will and ability to act together in the short term, in the longer term 
may further erode the belief in the necessity of common action. 
 
Increasing the number of partnerships will inevitably mean that some-
one will have to pay – and in an era of austerity, all forms of assis-
tance to and exercises with partners mean having to cut elsewhere. 
Creating a global NATO may not necessarily mean that every member 
will have to participate, only that all give their tacit support. Those 
that wish to contribute to global partnerships may do so without the 
full participation of all members, creating ‘partnerships of the willing’ 
under a NATO flag. Whether it will be possible to combine collective 
defence and a global NATO without deepening the fractures in the 
Alliance will remain a core question, however.  
 
The strategic dilemma for NATO is that while the money shrinks the 
tasks proliferate, thus making it unable to set priorities in a strategic 
environment which is highly fluid and complex. While the Smart De-
fence concept aims at enabling NATO to do more with less, it might 
be time to focus on doing what matters with less. While having fewer 
priorities would allow the Alliance to be more effective, contingencies 
such as the Arab Spring continue to attract its attention, driving its 
policies and planning at the expense of longer-term strategies. The cri-
                                                 
54  Interview with NATO official, 18 September 2012. 
55  Moore, Rebecca (2012), ‘Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy’, 
Perceptions, Spring 2012, Volume XVII, Number 1, p.57.  
32 Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud 
ses in the Middle East and North Africa have already reshaped the se-
curity environment, but the threat perceptions of each member state 
will inevitably vary. This will make the Alliance’s policy and decision 
making capacity towards the region difficult. This may force member 
states with interests in the region to develop and strengthen its own 
bilateral relationships there at the expense of NATO’s efforts, further 
undermining its partnerships and ambitions in the region. As such, 
tensions within NATO over how to set priorities in an era of financial 
austerity and diverging interests are likely to have a deep effect on its 
future policies towards the MENA region. 
External limitations – Regional Rivalries and Political 
Change  
With domestic political change sweeping across the Middle East and 
North Africa, struggles for influence and leadership in the region have 
intensified, altering the international relations of the MENA states. 
Given the security interdependencies in the MENA RSC, the impact 
and outcomes of the Arab Spring cannot be understood in isolation 
from the larger regional picture and the policies and actions of major 
regional players as well as other external factors. The security dimen-
sions of these events have significant geopolitical implications in 
which outside powers play an important part. Although NATO is 
seeking a far more influential role, through its partnerships, in the 
MENA, such ambitions are likely to be curbed by domestic political 
changes that have led to a more assertive audience sceptical to the 
West, and regional rivalries and changing alliances that have led states 
to pursue policies more independent of the West.   
Regional Rivalries 
What started as uprisings against the regime in Damascus and soon 
turned into a civil war has now evolved into a regional conflict over 
power and influence in the region. Syria has become the battlefront in 
which this regional power struggle unfolds – all major players of the 
region as well as many outside powers are represented, directly or in-
directly, supporting one side or the other. Although strategic calcula-
tions may be at the forefront of the regional rivalries in Syria, regional 
involvements have introduced a sectarian (Sunni versus Shia) division 
to the conflict which have made the political landscape in the region 
even more complex and uncertain. It could be argued that the current 
struggles have shifted the political epicentre of the greater Middle East 
away from the Israel issue and the Israel–Palestine conflict towards 
the Gulf and the struggle for regional hegemony between Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and possibly also Egypt. Evident of this shift can also 
be seen in the attention given to the Iranian nuclear programme by 
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Western states and institutions as well many MENA states in recent 
years. Syria has become ‘part of a region-wide tussle that is essentially 
about the re-calibration of two interrelated balances of power: one be-
tween Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; the second the over-
all regional balance of power between the American-Israeli axis and 
Iran.’56 While the Middle East and the Gulf are seen as the MENA 
subcomplexes most important to NATO security, events in North Af-
rica should not be underestimated. Power vacuums resulting from the 
fall of many authoritarian regimes may easily be exploited by terror-
ists, militants, traffickers and others, providing a security rationale for 
deeper NATO involvement.  
 
The sectarian dimension of the conflict has intensified the rivalries 
between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran. While both states see 
themselves as protectors of Islam, their foreign policy outlooks differ 
considerably. In simplified terms, Saudi Arabia can be seen as a re-
gional power seeking to maintain the status quo, whereas Iran seeks 
revolutionary change throughout the region. However, during the Ar-
ab Spring uprisings, the two followed strikingly similar policies, 
aimed at bolstering their regional influence and strengthening regime 
survival in the face of external and internal threats. If a troubled re-
gime was an ally they supported it; if not, they called for change. This 
was most evident in their foreign policies towards Bahrain and Syria, 
with each trying to use its influence and power to support its side in 
the conflicts.  
 
The emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies, 
especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as a major player in the MENA 
region marks a very significant shift in the dynamics of the region.57 
They put themselves on the forefront of a counterrevolution to con-
tain, and possibly also to reverse, the Arab Spring, viewing the events 
as a cause for real and immediate concern to their regime security. In a 
fast-changing regional scenario, the priority of Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf monarchies was to secure their own regimes, avoid widespread 
unrest, and maintain the status quo – in turn making the economic, 
political and religious dimensions even more intertwined in the Gulf 
monarchies’ new strategies towards the MENA region. This was evi-
dent when the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, sent troops to help its Bah-
raini ally King Hamad Al-Khalifa quell the unrest there. Because the 
uprisings in Bahrain were conducted largely by the Shia population, 
putting it down has widened the sectarian divide in the region. In addi-
tion, the Gulf monarchies have been quite generous to their MENA 
neighbours, providing them with huge loans and grants. Using their oil 
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wealth to gain influence in the region, ‘the financial assistance that is 
being provided by the EU is now being overshadowed by the far more 
generous offers from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-
tries.’58 Saudi Arabia alone has granted Egypt $4 billion,59 while Jor-
dan and Morocco (to mention only two), get far more from the GCC 
than from their cash-strapped Western partners. Although the details 
of these deals are not known, they are likely to have very different 
strings attached than those coming from Western states and institu-
tions, which are usually made contingent on domestic reforms. With 
less stringent reforms attached, these loans and grants may well be 
better offers than those from the West.  
 
With the influx of sweeping political change in the region, countering 
the growing Iranian influence has become a more compelling priority 
for many, if not all, of the major players in the region. In addition to 
the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, their aggres-
sive stance in the region has led the Gulf monarchies and the US into a 
deeper, more symbiotic relationship, trying to contain Iranian influ-
ence and possibly thwart Tehran’s perceived nuclear ambitions. This 
was highlighted by the recent arms deal worth a staggering $123 bil-
lion between the Gulf monarchies and the US60, which is aimed at re-
inforcing the level of regional deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. While 
NATO’s new missile defence plans points towards convergence as to 
the threat that Iran constitutes towards Alliance territory it is the US 
and not NATO that remains paramount to Gulf security. Instead, the 
USA has been focusing on building up its own partnership structure in 
the region with the GCC and other allies in order to contain and deter 
Iran. NATO’s relative absence from recent developments in the Gulf 
region only serves to reinforce views of its limited role there.  
 
In Syria, the future of the Iranian security system is at stake. Not only 
is Persian Iran is close to losing its main Arab and Shia ally – but 
should this happen, it might also weaken Tehran’s ability to support 
their protégé and proxy militia Hezbollah. Such a scenario would curb 
Iranian influence in the region, but while a strengthening of Sunni 
power in the region would weaken Iran, it is far from certain that an 
insecure and isolated Iran would be better for stability in the region. It 
could make Tehran even more determined in its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons to fend off perceived interventions, and more assertive in at-
tempts at propping up other proxy militias in the region in order to 
increase its influence and ensure its regime survival.  
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While Iran has pushed the US even closer to Saudi Arabia and the 
other Gulf monarchies, its longstanding security architecture in the 
Eastern Mediterranean subcomplex, US-Turkey-Israel and US-Israel-
Egypt, seems to be going the other way. Egypt, Israel and Turkey are 
all pursuing increasingly independent policies which clash with US 
interests.61 This is part of a broader trend that makes it even more dif-
ficult for Washington to set the agenda and shape the outcomes of 
events in the region. With NATO-member Turkey and Israel – histori-
cally the closest US allies in the region – drifting further apart, and 
with Egypt embroiled in domestic unrest with a population sceptical to 
the West and the US, Washington is likely to be forced to make more 
bilateral agreements with a greater emphasis on continuous contingen-
cy management at the expense of long-term strategies. While this en-
tails a more direct role for the US, it is unclear as to what extent 
Washington will be able to shape and influence the policies in the re-
gion. Moreover, NATO’s partnerships and influence in the region are 
largely dependent on US allies and backing, making it unlikely for 
NATO to exert more influence on its own. 
Domestic Political Change 
Along with the regional rivalries in the region, the domestic political 
changes and the population’s negative perceptions of the West and 
NATO in particular are likely to shape the Alliance’s options in the 
MENA. Because the West has for decades viewed maintaining the sta-
tus quo through propping up friendly autocracies as the best way of 
preserving stability and security in the MENA, ‘Arabs tend to view 
NATO as a powerful, aggressive alliance committed to promoting the 
security and political interests of the West.’62 Whereas MENA popula-
tions have always had a negative view of Western policies towards the 
region, the Arab Spring has shown repressive regimes how disgruntled 
populations are capable of leading regimes to fear internal threats as 
much as, if not more than, external threats to their survival. If coop-
eration with the West seems set to increase domestic instability, then 
these governments will probably shy away from such cooperation, 
opting instead to collaborate with and accept more influence from 
neighbours or other international powers. As Gause and Lustick argue, 
‘a major shift is occurring in the region toward political systems 
where the consent of the governed is necessary for stable domestic 
politics and where public opinion plays a much greater role in the 
making of foreign policy.’63  
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This leads to a paradox that NATO will have to take seriously. While 
deepening NATO ties may enhance security against external threats, 
they might cause domestic unrest and thus internal instability for 
MENA regimes. In addition, this creates a problematic relationship 
between promoting democracy and maintaining stability within the 
region. While relying on friendly autocracies has failed to bolster se-
curity and stability, democratic regimes may be deeply sceptical to the 
West and its institutions, thus possibly weakening NATO’s role in the 
region. Thus it seems ironic that the strategy of including former So-
viet Union states into NATO and the West was based on the idea that 
democracies do not fight each other which would lead to increased 
security and stability. In the MENA, the converse may prove true: in 
the short term, democracy may increase instability and insecurity and 
possibly further limit NATO’s influence there. The long term conse-
quences is however unclear.  
 
Because perceptions of NATO matter, how to engage in a region 
where most of the population is opposed to the organization is an im-
portant question. Can existing functional security arrangements be 
maintained with democratic regimes in the MENA? To that, Mustafa 
Alani argues: ‘until NATO is able to address (…) and overcome the 
negative image it has in the Middle East, the Alliance has little pro-
spect of ever playing a constructive role in the region’.64 NATO’s 
public diplomacy division has tried to address this problem with out-
reach programmes to the region,65 but without success. Decades of 
policies widely seen as humiliating and aggressive are not going to be 
mended by outreach programmes alone. 
Turkey – Bridge or Regional Hegemon? 
The best option for NATO to assert any influence in the region may 
be through Turkey – but this may prove possible only if NATO can 
manage to align itself with Turkey’s interests in the region.  
 
As a NATO member and a state that borders the Middle East, Turkey 
has one foot in each regional security complex and thus much at stake 
in events in the MENA region. During the Cold War, Turkey’s geo-
strategic location, its military and its position as a flank country were 
indispensable assets in NATO’s attempts to contain and deter the So-
viet Union. Although a valuable asset during the Cold War, Turkey 
depended on NATO as a consumer of security, which limited its own 
foreign policy choices. Since then Turkey has made a ‘remarkable 
transformation from essentially a functional ally reliant on its hard 
power for much of the Cold War and early post–Cold War era to a 
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strategic partner that is more reliant on its soft power.’66 Along with 
its economic growth, Turkey has sought to increase its influence in its 
neighbourhood by pursuing an independent foreign and security poli-
cy that has often gone against the mainstream policies of NATO 
members. This new foreign policy has been based a ‘zero problems 
approach’ vis-à-vis its neighbours, rather than the security-first ap-
proach that often led to confrontations in the past. With Turkey fa-
vouring diplomatic engagement with all surrounding countries, NATO 
became only one aspect of its wider security policies. While this new 
engagement with neighbours has security benefits for the West, it also 
raised concerns about the possibility of Turkey drifting farther east-
wards in its ideology and policies. Although this new foreign policy 
aimed to transform Turkey into a regional power independent from the 
West, this did not mean turning its back on the West. Turkey attempt-
ed to diversify its foreign policy by balancing the West while seeking 
influence in other regions, like the broader MENA region.  
 
In order to not become the frontline state of NATO in the Middle East, 
Turkey, as a part of its ‘zero problems’ approach, maintained that Syr-
ia and Iran should not be viewed as threats to any of NATO’s mem-
bers. However, this all started to change when Turkey accepted the 
emplacement of radars that were to serve the new NATO missile 
shield. Although Turkey went to great strides to reassure Iran that this 
posed no threat, and that Turkey would not allow the stations to be 
used in any form of foreign interference, relations between the two 
states deteriorated. The ‘zero problems approach’ in foreign policy 
also encountered difficulties with the Arab Spring. Turkey was quick 
to support democratic change in the region, although it initially spoke 
out against military action in Libya. To Ankara’s secular democratic 
regime, the Arab Spring meant a reaffirmation of Turkey’s own de-
mocracy consolidation, vindicated by the fact that many countries saw 
a model for their own revolutions. As the only country that has 
wholeheartedly supported democratic change in the region, Turkey 
seemed best positioned to play a leading role in a more democratic 
region, although this also put Ankara on collision course with many 
regimes in the region. While Turkey is a regional beneficiary of the 
recent democratic developments and will ‘continue to be the inspira-
tional leader for Arab democratization and liberation efforts’,67 the 
outcome of these processes is far from certain. The current move to-
wards more democracy in the region may well get reversed in terms of 
benefiting Turkey. Indeed, given the changing balance of power in the 
region coupled with regional instability and wars, Turkey will have to 
reshape its foreign and security policies. Not only has the ‘zero prob-
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lems’ approach been forced to change, but regional instability means 
that access to NATO has once again become a highly valuable asset 
likely to move Ankara’s policies closer towards the US and NATO. 
This has been highlighted by Turkey’s demands for solidarity and as-
sistance following the shooting down of a Turkish plane and the recur-
rent shelling of Turkish territory by Damascus. In response, NATO 
has agreed to augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities by deploying 
Patriot missiles in Turkey ‘in the spirit of strong solidarity’68. Also, 
the establishment of the new Allied Land Command in Izmir is a sign 
of renewed commitment from NATO towards Turkey, signalling a 
shift in NATO priorities towards its southern borders and the MENA 
region. Although NATO–Turkey relations have been somewhat uncer-
tain in the past, these recent events indicate a renewed mutual com-
mitment.  
 
Both NATO and Turkey share an interest in stabilizing the MENA 
region. Any further unrest and regional rivalries are likely to make 
Ankara’s foreign and security policies more dependent on the West 
and Western institutions. However, Turkey is also rapidly becoming 
an indispensable strategic partner in the MENA, not just for NATO 
but also for the EU. This security interdependency may lead to a more 
sustained and constructive partnership in shaping the future of the re-
gion.  Unlike the situation during the Cold War, where the West and 
NATO dictated Ankara’s MENA strategy, Turkey is now likely to try 
for a leading role in shaping the evolving transatlantic strategy in the 
region. In turn, NATO will have to adjust to a more assertive Turkey – 
possibly entailing new divergences in security priorities between Tur-
key and its NATO allies, especially if Ankara’s relations to its region-
al rivals deteriorate further. 
 
Although Turkey supports a strengthening and deepening of the Medi-
terranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the big ques-
tion is not only the appropriate role for NATO in the larger MENA 
region, but also what NATO’s core task should be. Turkey has held 
that NATO should primarily be a collective defence alliance orga-
nized around Article 5 operations, rather than an organization with 
global outlooks out-of-area operational focus. While this is in line 
with the views of many of European counterparts, it is clearly at odds 
with the US, which wants NATO to take a more assertive role in glob-
al security.  
 
It could be argued that NATO is not the right organization to deal with 
security and stability challenges in the MENA region that are is more 
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socio-economic than security/military in character. What is needed is 
a comprehensive approach that can bring together civilian and well as 
military capabilities in order to address the challenges in and from the 
region. This brings to the forefront the question of NATO-EU cooper-
ation (a recurrent theme in European and transatlantic security dis-
course for decades), but also what sort of role the EU can play in the 
region. According to Fogh Rasmussen, NATO and the EU ‘can, and 
should, play complimentary and mutually reinforcing roles in support-
ing international peace and security.’69 However, the EU suffers from 
many of the same problems as NATO – internal divisions (intra-
institutional and between member states) and serious financial con-
straints, as well as a strained image in the MENA region.70  
 
Although NATO/EU prospects for finding a common approach to the 
MENA region is hampered by their relative standing in the region, by 
financial constraints and internal divisions, that is not to say that 
NATO and the EU should not come together to find a burden-sharing 
agreement towards the area. On the other hand, even if the two institu-
tions could find a way to cooperate, this approach would probably 
prove less influential had it not been for their common problems. Even 
though a comprehensive approach would be the best way of enhancing 
security and stability in the MENA, there are no shortage of issues in 
which NATO could play a role on its own. If NATO is to achieve its 
goals of enhancing security and stability and strengthening and deep-
ening its partnerships, it must focus on establishing a shared vision for 
the future of the region as well as making itself an attractive partner.  
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Possibilities for NATO’s Future Policy 
towards the MENA Region 
During the initial stages of writing up the new strategic concept, the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners 
were actively involved in the debate leading to its adoption. By in-
cluding its partners in this process NATO wanted to signal the im-
portance it places on its partnerships. The Strategic Concept itself re-
fers specifically to the MD and ICI, with the aim of strengthening and 
deepening the cooperation with current members and opening the 
partnerships up to new members.71 This was again confirmed at the 
Chicago Summit in May 2012: ‘At a time of unprecedented change in 
the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to 
strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in 
the region, with whom we face common security challenges and share 
the same goals for peace, security and stability.’72 The Summit also 
offered support to its partners through individualized programmes in 
areas like security institution building, defence modernization, capaci-
ty development, and civil–military relations, allowing a focus on 
agreed priorities for each partner country while stressing the need for 
the MD and ICI partners to become more proactive in exploiting the 
opportunities offered by NATO.  
 
While official NATO documents and statements routinely underscore 
the importance of strengthening and developing the partnerships in the 
MENA region, this is not reflected in ongoing discussions about 
NATO. Perhaps the most startling finding from the present research 
has been the relative absence of discussions about NATO’s future ap-
proach towards the MENA – in the academic literature, in the media 
and within NATO. Indeed, NATO’s approaches to the MENA region 
and the MD and ICI partnerships have been of little interest to schol-
ars. This may be a symptom of the historically low importance placed 
on these partnerships by NATO and its members in practice, but, giv-
en the current situation it is surprising. In NATO the situation in the 
MENA is usually brought up in relation to the collective defence of 
Turkey and Article IV consultations, not in relation to the partnerships 
in general. When partnerships are discussed, this is done in general 
terms arguing for the importance of partnerships in general and need 
                                                 
71  Strategic Concept , para.35. 
72  Chicago Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, paras. 39–44. 
42 Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud 
for global partnerships to improve Alliance members’ security.73 
There have been few discussions of a long-term vision for the devel-
opment of security and stability in the MENA region, or even how 
strengthening and developing partnerships could or should be under-
taken.  
 
This report argues that NATO’s possibilities for strengthening and 
developing cooperation with the MENA region in order to contribute 
to regional security and stability hinges on two vital factors: its ability 
to compromise on future priorities for the Alliance and especially its 
role in the MENA region, and its ability to make the Alliance an at-
tractive partner for the states in the region.  
Internal possibilities – a Shared Vision for the MENA Region 
With its presence in Afghanistan dwindling, NATO is once again en-
tering into the debate on its future role. The Strategic Concept adopted 
in November 2010 aims to guide the next phase, but by emphasizing 
three essential core tasks the Concept has taken into account all the 
various issues of its members, thereby opening up the Concept to dif-
fering interpretations by its different members. Although NATO has 
produced a classified political guidance document to direct NATO 
planners,74 it does little to alleviate the disagreements within NATO 
on what its core business should be. While most European members 
see it as a regional military alliance that should focus on collective 
defence, the US and a few other members stress the importance of 
NATO’s global ‘expansion’ as a hub in a global security network. 
This debate affects how NATO should deal with the MENA region 
and what role it should have there.  
 
Partnerships are not an end in themselves. In the absence of a link be-
tween partnerships and membership, NATO will need to clarify its 
mandate and ambitions for its MENA partnerships, towards its part-
ners but also to its members. What is the added value for NATO from 
these partnerships? Is it reasonable to expect that partners themselves 
will eventually take care of security of stability in their own region, 
given the regional rivalries and difference security perceptions? Is the 
aim to get more partners to operate alongside NATO in future mis-
sions? or is it simply to cooperate on common security challenges, 
whatever they may be? Secondly, NATO must agree on what role it 
should play in the region. Should it be a political role, constructing 
partnerships around the values of individual liberty, democracy, hu-
man rights and the rule of law, as in the Central and Eastern European 
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states? or should NATO focus on a more pragmatic and practical rela-
tionship limited primarily to the provision of training, advising and 
assisting (TAA) opportunities for willing MENA militaries?  
 
Establish common goals. The starting point for any discussion on how 
NATO could strengthen and develop its partnerships should be to es-
tablish its goals towards the MENA region. This should start with 
identifying common security challenges emanating from the region. 
Whereas issues such as regional wars, terrorism, proliferation of 
WMD, failed states and power vacuums, migration and energy securi-
ty may all cause concern for NATO members, it is clear that those 
states in closest geographical proximity to the region will have differ-
ent threat perceptions than those further away – Turkey’s perceptions 
of the region and the urgency of the issues there differs from those of 
Norway, for example. While it may be difficult to agree on specific 
issues or the immediate concerns of the various members, NATO 
would be wise to focus on what its goals in the region should be, in 
order to establish what it wants from its partnerships. The goal of en-
hancing security and stability in the region would require a compre-
hensive approach that would go far beyond military solutions – many 
of the sources of instability that became evident with the Arab Spring 
were socio-economic in origin, which is not where NATO’s expertise 
rests. Stability in the MENA region would require reform of govern-
ments, economic development, greater individual freedoms, and ad-
dressing grievances and inequalities issues – matters clearly out of 
NATO’s reach. Thus, NATO would do well to understand its limits 
and lower its ambitions by focusing on the less ambitious goal of solv-
ing common security challenges through cooperation. This would not 
mean that norms and values should not guide NATO’s approach to the 
region, but rather that NATO understands its limitations in seeking to 
deal with issues well beyond its expertise and reach. If the ambitious 
goal of security and stability in the region is to be endorsed, it will be 
necessary to achieve consensus on a shared vision for the long-term 
development of this goal. If, however, a less ambitious goal is estab-
lished, the partnerships can be envisioned in a more pragmatic sense 
of working together on solving common problems. Establishing what 
NATO’s goals in the region are will allow for a clearer idea of what it 
wants from its partnerships and what ‘strengthening and developing 
partnerships’ actually means.  
 
Establish working agreement. For NATO to find a common goal to-
wards the MENA region, it must also carve out a working agreement 
between the organization and those of its members with strong bilat-
eral ties to the region, in order to avoid turf battles and duplication of 
efforts. This way, NATO would know where it can bring in its exper-
tise and added value, and where it is acceptable to do so without med-
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dling in its members’ affairs. In addition, NATO must find a working 
relationship with the EU that can ensure a comprehensive approach to 
the region and a burden-sharing agreement that will avoid duplication 
of efforts.  
 
Norms and Values. While political dialogue is often cited as an im-
portant part of NATO partnerships, this has so far not been fruitful in 
the MENA region. What has worked to some extent is the technical 
military-to-military TAA, as highlighted with the inclusion of MENA 
partners in the Libya operation. However, in basing the partnerships 
on a pragmatic policy that favoured stability over democracy, NATO 
sacrificed its own values, and in the end this did not promote in-
creased security and stability in the region. On the contrary, the upris-
ings in the region were against many of the regimes that NATO and 
its members had viewed as useful in maintaining the status quo. Alt-
hough NATO continues to work with partners that do not share all its 
values, it may now be time for values and norms to play a more con-
structive role in NATO’s efforts to strengthen and develop its partner-
ships to increase stability and security. One way to do this is to focus 
on good governance and reform rather than explicitly on democratic 
values and individual liberties. That may make it possible to promote 
some values and engage democratic reformists to alleviate some of 
NATO’s negative reputation, while balancing this against the interest 
in political stability and cooperation towards common challenges. The 
hope for liberal democracies to flourish in the region will have to be 
balanced with the need to work with the region as it is rather than 
what we would like it to be. 
External Possibilities – an Attractive Partner 
Common ownership. If NATO is able to agree on a common approach 
towards the MENA region, it will need to revitalize its partnerships 
there by making itself more attractive as a partner towards the MENA 
states. This will have to start with developing partnerships with a gen-
uine common ownership. This has been problematic; prior to the Chi-
cago Summit in 2012, Morocco led an initiative to develop a new po-
litical framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue. Even though this 
initiative was welcomed at the Chicago Summit,75 it does not seem to 
have helped the Dialogue further. According to Nasser Bourita, the 
Secretary General of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation, the MD is still driven by NATO, leaving little or no 
sense of ownership to the non-NATO members. Indeed, the Alliance 
decides on its own what it offers to its partners, with little consultation 
about what they actually want or need. Without a shared process the 
Mediterranean partners feel like the ‘other’, where NATO sees only 
                                                 
75   Chicago Summit Declaration, , Para 42. 
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challenges and risks rather than opportunities. This makes it difficult 
for the partnership to move forward.76 This is also true of the ICI. 
Without a link from partnership to membership, these MENA partner-
ships would benefit tremendously from an approach that could estab-
lish common ownership instead of a top–down approach from NATO. 
Such common ownership would make it easier to establish what the 
common security challenges are, how to deal with them, and what 
NATO can offer to its partners in this respect. In addition, common 
ownership would probably do much to alleviate the mutual mistrust 
and misperceptions that have plagued cooperation in the past.  
 
Added Value. Many partners and potential partners have been reluc-
tant to advance security cooperation with NATO because of the mod-
est added value it offered regarding other bilateral cooperation ar-
rangements available to them. This was something NATO tried to ad-
dress with the Berlin package, but it remains unclear just what added 
value NATO can offer. The Alliance partnerships are unlikely to sub-
stitute for the bilateral political and security ties MENA states have 
with various individual NATO members and other states. Because 
NATO cannot offer any security guarantees on a par with Article V, it 
needs to do a better job at articulating to its partners what they cannot 
get elsewhere. This requires a dialogue with its partners, not merely a 
list of activities that they can pick and choose from. Because NATO is 
more a service provider than a security provider per se, it needs to 
clarify its strategy and what it is prepared to offer in terms of actual 
security of the region, as well as what it expects from its partners. This 
way, NATO can establish true partnerships aimed at sharing the bur-
den for security and stability in the MENA region.  
 
NATO training is welcomed by several states in the region, including 
non-partners such as Saudi Arabia, and this could be an avenue where 
NATO can bring added value. This could prove a credible and afford-
able basis for developing and strengthening the MENA relationships 
as more technical cooperation can enhance trust and confidence and 
help establish mutual benefit between the partners. However, NATO 
will need to focus on the quality and not the quantity of the activities 
offered. More is not always better. The Berlin package, which in-
creased the activities offered by NATO, did little to enhance actual 
cooperation. If the partners are invited to develop and articulate re-
quests for assistance, in consultation with NATO, on areas where they 
actually need support rather than picking from a list of options, the 
partnerships can be moved forward. Previously, the concept of non-
imposition has led NATO to take a reactive stance towards its partner-
ships, waiting for them to approach the Alliance for assistance rather 
                                                 
76  Lecture and interview with H.E. Nasser Bourita, Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco, NUPI, Oslo, 28 Nov. 2012. 
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than proactively offering assistance in areas where NATO knows 
there is an improvement potential. This stance has brought only lim-
ited success, so it may now be time for NATO to become more proac-
tive towards its partners, offering them assistance rather than waiting 
to be approached. Being more proactive does not have to mean that 
NATO imposes itself on its partners. On the contrary, it may actually 
signal that NATO values its partnerships.  
 
Norms and values. Because of declining military capabilities and un-
willingness to use them, NATO might be pragmatically best served by 
a focus on nurturing ties to those states with genuine military capabili-
ties and the willingness to use them to provide security and stability in 
the region and possibly elsewhere. But because this may not ensure 
security and stability in states where the governments is unable to up-
hold its monopoly on legitimate violence, helping them to govern and 
secure their territories will be vital. However, security and stability do 
not flow directly from the willingness to use military capabilities. The 
Arab Spring showed that where the regimes were willing to use armed 
force against the populations, the situation only deteriorated. While it 
may only be by chance that the political changes in partner countries 
like Egypt or Tunisia have been much less violent than those in Libya 
or Syria, it may also be that exposure to a democratic institution like 
NATO has had a positive effect on the military establishment in those 
countries. While there are certainly many other reasons why Libya 
and Syria became far more violent than Tunisia and Egypt, a focus on 
NATO values may bring another added element to traditional notions 
of security and stability. By convincing its partners that addressing 
socio-economic grievances through governmental reform may en-
hance their own internal stability, NATO may be able to combine a 
pragmatic partnership based on cooperation towards common security 
challenges, while addressing root causes through reference to basic 
NATO norms and values.  
 
Focus on bilateral relationships. Floating alliances, regional rivalries 
and differences in threat perceptions among the MENA states all make 
it difficult to work with the region in clusters under the banner of the 
MD and the ICI, and the multilateral approach in the MD has suffered 
from this. Although the idea of creating a shared vision for the region 
through multilateral dialogue makes good sense from a theoretical 
standpoint, in reality the partners have such different needs and expec-
tations that it seems strange to group them together – NATO cannot be 
expected to have a common vision or purpose for them all. The MD 
consists of two distinct sub-complexes, the Maghreb and the Mashreq. 
The ICI covers parts of the Gulf, while the traditional Middle Eastern 
subcomplex is only partially covered. While the entire MENA RSC 
may share some common challenges, the differing perceptions, socio-
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economic realities and geographical locations mean that all states have 
different outlooks. This brings up the question of whether NATO 
should continue to approach the region in two clusters, or focus more 
on bilateral ties outside the MD and ICI frameworks. Focusing on 
clusters make sense only if the partnerships have common security 
perceptions. While states of the region share some common percep-
tions, this is far from the whole picture. With regional rivalries and 
domestic political change sweeping through the MENA region, things 
may change dramatically. Thus it would be wise for NATO to focus 
more on IPCPs with individual states, instead of trying to strengthen 
and further develop the MD and ICI partnership frameworks. Offering 
a more tailored approach to each partner may heighten the profile of 
the partnerships among the partners, as they will be treated as distinct 
from other states and not lumped together in clusters. Increasing the 
status of the partnerships may also entice other states to join, as well 
as encouraging the partners to become more active. Thus NATO 
should also focus on heightening the profile of the partnerships by ap-
pointing a special representative to the region as well as raising the 
representation at the partnership meetings to a higher level.  
 
In the short term, NATO will be challenged in responding to urgencies 
as events on the ground evolve, and future prospects of security and 
stability in the region. Although these may not be mutually exclusive, 
any form of meddling in the region is likely to have repercussions for 
NATO’s future standing and prospects for cooperation. Here it is apt 
to recall Henry Kissinger’s observation of the two key challenges of 
conducting foreign policy: learning to distinguish between urgent and 
important matters, and then devising techniques to keep the urgent 
from taking over from the important.77 There is no shortage of urgent 
matters in the region – but distinguishing these from the important 
will be vital when NATO is to consider its options for meeting the 
new challenges in the MENA region. Such a long-term vision of de-
velopment in the region must start with crafting common ownership 
between the Alliance and the MENA states, as well as a focus on 
where NATO can bring added value. In this way, NATO can make 
itself attractive to the MENA states. 
 
                                                 
77  See for instance: Henry Kissinger’s US Naval Academy Forrestal Lecture, Annapolis, 
Maryland, April 11, 2007, available at:  
http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/041107.html 
Implications for Norway 
Because NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian defence and security 
policy, any changes to NATO’s priorities will likely have implications 
for Norway. As this report has shown, the debate about the future evo-
lution of NATO and its approach to the MENA region is still ‘up in 
the air’. This makes an informed analysis about the implications for 
Norway very difficult. Although the prospects for greater emphasis on 
the MENA region within NATO are slim, the various developments 
sketched out in this report are likely to have implications for Norway. 
As has been evident from the recent terrorist attack on the gas plant in 
In Amenas, Algeria, events within the MENA region itself should be 
followed closely, as they may affect the economic and security inter-
ests of Norway. The main implication for Norway that can be drawn 
from this report is that Norway needs to balance its need for NATO as 
a collective defence alliance and a credible deterrence as well as an 
Alliance that is both able and willing to contribute collectively to se-
curity and stability in its own neighbourhood. The main implication 
for Norway that can be drawn from this report is that Norway needs to 
balance its need for NATO as a collective defence alliance and a cred-
ible deterrence as well as an Alliance that is both able and willing to 
contribute collectively to security and stability in its own neighbour-
hood. 
 
 Collective defence focus. NATO is the cornerstone of Nor-
way’s security policy and vital for its threshold defence. As 
such, a capable Alliance is of paramount importance, and 
Norway should pay close attention to the ongoing defence cuts 
within NATO. It is essential for Norway to contribute to and 
encourage the development of NATO as a credible institution 
for deterrence and collective defence as well as being able to 
meet new security challenges.78 Given the financial austerity 
and diverging interests, Norway would be well advised to 
stress the need for a credible collective defence capacity within 
the Alliance before embarking on new missions and roles. 
 
 Improve regional defence cooperation. One way of increasing 
NATO’s collective capabilities is through regional defence co-
operation. Norway places great weight on cooperative ar-
rangements such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation and the 
                                                 
78 Forsvarsdepartementet(Norwegian MOD (2012), Et forsvar for vår tid, Prop. 73 S (2011–
2012), Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak), 23 March 2012 
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Northern Group as well as other types of multinational defence 
cooperation. This is something that is clearly valued in NATO 
if it complements, rather than hampers, the ongoing Smart De-
fence initiative in the Alliance. However, Norway needs to 
make sure that these forms of regional clustering do not inter-
fere with NATO’s decision-making capacities or its operation-
al effectiveness.  
 
 Focus on the region and the neighbourhood. Norway should 
make sure that ongoing efforts within NATO at achieving a 
global focus do not come at the expense of NATO’s own terri-
tories and its immediate neighbourhood. While there certainly 
are security interests in, for instance, the Asia-Pacific, there are 
plenty of issues within NATO and its neighbourhood that 
could merit more attention. All members share an interest in a 
secure and stabile MENA region; and although they might not 
agree on how to deal with it, finding a working solution to the 
security environment there should have priority over ‘going 
global’. Norway could do well to press harder for a common 
approach to the MENA region, as goodwill from many mem-
bers who view this region as extremely important could prove 
useful if Norway one day needs attention brought to its inter-
ests in the Arctic.   
 
 MENA vs. the Arctic. If NATO manages to prepare a common 
strategy towards the MENA, aimed at giving it priority over 
other regions, Norway should pay close attention. Although in-
stability in the MENA region should be of concern to Norway 
as well as those members that are in closer proximity to the re-
gion, such prioritization should be weighed against the conse-
quences for Norway’s most important strategic area, the Arc-
tic. The Arctic today is an area with almost no security con-
cerns and Norway’s relations with its Arctic neighbours can be 
deemed good. A focus on the southern part of NATO’s borders 
is unlikely to alter the situation in the North, but two points 
should be considered. One: an increased focus on the MENA 
region may alleviate some of the tensions between NATO and 
Russia, in turn helping to ensure better working relations with 
Norway’s neighbour. Second: a focus away from the High 
North might leave Norway open to more outside pressure, 
which in turn could lead to increased insecurity and instability. 
In such a scenario, the two would have to be balanced, alt-
hough security and stability in the Arctic are currently not un-
der pressure.  
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 Strengthen transatlantic relationship. The US is Norway’s top-
priority partner; if Washington’s interests diverge from those 
of Norway, a carefully balanced strategy to make NATO and 
Norway relevant for the US is vital. While increased collective 
capacity of the Alliance is something that would be favoured 
in Washington, the US desire to build a more global NATO 
may be at odds with the interests and financial capacities of 
several European states. Should the US move most of its ef-
forts east, towards the Asia/Pacific, shared practices and con-
tact points between the Europeans and the American may de-
cline and thus also what NATO is. As such, an effort to ‘keep 
the Americans in’ may be the most important aspect of the fu-
ture of NATO. This will have to start with investing in greater 
capabilities in order for Europe to take more care of its own 
security, not with an ambitious bid to ‘go global’. 
 
 Interoperability and training. Increased capabilities may en-
sure that NATO can enhance its interoperability with the US. 
Although this can address only the capabilities gap, and not the 
problems of political will to act, it can show the US side that 
the Europeans have relevant capabilities. In order to increase 
Norway’s relevance to the US and NATO, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces should focus on exercises within their own op-
erational area in a NATO context. This will ensure that they 
are familiar with Norway’s operational area as well as con-
necting FOH closer to its main allies. If increasing the capabil-
ities of NATO for collective defence and crisis management 
should conflict with strengthening and deepening the partner-
ships in the MENA and elsewhere, the former should have pri-
ority prioritized. If the two are not mutually exclusive, Norway 
would be well advised to contribute to efforts that can bolster 
the security and stability of the MENA region, whether though 
political efforts or military-to-military cooperation.  
 
 Consider Norwegian security agreements with MENA states.  
Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of NATO’s poli-
cies towards the MENA and the ability of its partnerships to 
provide security and stability in the region, Norway should 
consider strengthening and developing its bilateral ties to 
MENA states in which Norway has special economic or secu-
rity interests. 
Conclusion 
Recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have already un-
dermined security and stability in the region. Although this new secu-
rity environment calls for a response from NATO, it has so far played 
a hesitant role towards the MENA. This reflects its problematic histor-
ical experience and its fragmented record of developing working rela-
tionships with partners there. While NATO’s historical track record in 
the region does not reflect the importance placed on the region by 
many of its members and the organization itself, competing priorities 
within the Alliance and the political changes and regional rivalries in 
the region have made NATO’s stated aim of strengthening and devel-
oping its partnerships to enhance regional security and stability even 
more difficult. This report have concentrated on analysing how these 
factors, internal and external to the Alliance, shape its possibilities and 
limits in addressing the new security environment in the MENA. 
 
Ever since the Cold War ended, NATO has struggled to find a ra-
tionale in the new security environment and has in large part justified 
its existence on interventions. The warning that NATO should go ‘out 
of area or out of business’ has become more and more acute, and 
many member states looks increasingly drawn towards the ‘out of 
business’ side of the equation. This has profound implications for 
NATO as a political community whose members see their security as 
intertwined along with the necessity of common action. The Libya op-
eration showed that not all of Europe is debellicised with France and 
Britain taking a leading role with the support of many smaller Europe-
an states, but it also showed that NATO, once again, lacked political 
unity. As such, it could be argued that NATO as a political community 
of states who believe it should act together is rapidly deteriorating. 
The problem is that what NATO is and should become – what its core 
task(s) should be – is still a question that remains unanswered and the 
debates about NATO’s future continue to divide the Alliance.  
 
This is also evident in NATO’s approach towards the new security 
environment in the MENA. Because discussions about NATO’s future 
still divide the members, this report has argued that this is likely to be 
the case in NATO’s efforts to address the MENA region as well. 
Member-state perceptions of risk and threat towards the crises vary; 
and without financial clout or political will, NATO’s ability to estab-
lish a common vision for the future of the MENA region and its goals 
there for furthering security and stability remains limited. Although 
there are some ways in which NATO can strengthen and develop its 
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partnerships in order to promote security and stability in the region, it 
seems likely that the MENA partnerships will continue to have low 
priority, as in the past. This means that member states with interests in 
the region are likely to develop and strengthen their own bilateral rela-
tionships there which will come at the expense of NATO’s efforts, 
further undermining its partnerships  and ambitions in the region.  
 
In addition, NATO’s ambitions are likely to be curbed by domestic 
political changes in the MENA that have led to a more assertive audi-
ence sceptical to the West, and regional rivalries and changing alli-
ances that have led states to pursue policies more independent of the 
West. This will continue to hamper NATO’s ability to influence 
states’ strategies and subsequently its possibilities for strengthening 
and developing its partnerships to enhance security and stability on its 
own terms.  
 
While there certainly are more limits than possibilities for NATO to 
address the new security environment in the MENA, its possibilities 
hinges on finding a common vision for the future of the region and 
make itself attractive as a partner to the MENA states. First and fore-
most NATO needs to establish what its goals towards the region are. 
NATO should focus more narrowly on solving common security chal-
lenges through cooperation rather than the more ambitious goal of en-
hancing security and stability in the region. This will provide NATO 
with a clearer sense of what it wants from its partnerships and what 
‘strengthening and developing partnerships’ actually entails. In order 
to make itself more attractive to its partners, NATO must focus on 
creating a common ownership over the partnerships with the MENA 
states rather than the current top-down approach. This would help es-
tablish what the common security challenges are, how to deal with 
them through cooperation and what NATO can offer in this respect. In 
addition, NATO needs to articulate to its partners what they bring of 
added value that the partners cannot get through its other bilateral 
agreements. This means becoming more proactive towards its part-
ners, inviting them to develop and articulate requests for assistance, in 
consultation with NATO, on areas where they actually needs support 
rather than making them choose from a list of options.  
 
In the short term, NATO will be challenged in responding to urgencies 
as events on the ground evolve, and future prospects of security and 
stability in the region. Although these may not be mutually exclusive, 
any form of meddling in the region is likely to have repercussions for 
NATO’s future standing and prospects for cooperation. Here it is apt 
to recall Henry Kissinger’s observation of the two key challenges of 
conducting foreign policy: learning to distinguish between urgent and 
important matters, and then devising techniques to keep the urgent 
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from taking over from the important. There is no shortage of urgent 
matters in the region – but distinguishing these from the important 
will be vital when NATO is to consider its options for meeting the 
new challenges in the MENA region. Such a long-term vision of de-
velopment in the region must start with reaching a consensus within 
NATO on a shared vision for the future of the MENA region and its 
goals there, crafting common ownership between the Alliance and the 
MENA states, as well as a focus on where NATO can bring added 
value. In this way, NATO can make itself attractive to the MENA 
states.  
 
Because NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian defence and security 
policy, any changes in NATO’s priorities will likely have implications 
for Norway. While there are some possibilities for NATO to strength-
en and developing its partnerships in order to address the new security 
environment in the MENA, prospects for greater emphasis on and pri-
oritization of the region within NATO remains slim, at least in the 
short-term. Even so, the volatility of the region and its proximity to 
the Euro-Atlantic RSC means that contingencies may draw the Alli-
ance closer to the region in the future, and as such, events there must 
be followed closely. Regardless, this research has uncovered some is-
sues that may have implications for future Norwegian security and 
defence policies. The main implication for Norwegian security and 
defence policy that can be drawn from this report is that Norway 
needs to balance its need for NATO as a collective defence alliance 
and a credible deterrence as well as an Alliance that is both able and 
willing to contribute collectively to security and stability in its own 
neighbourhood. 
